Introduction
Must of us feel that children have rights. We are revolted to hear that children are abused and exploited. There is nothing more pitiful seen on television than starving children, their mothers with empty breasts. Child poverty is rightly seen as a grave social problem. Families with children compete with old age pensioners for the attention of right thinking voters and politicians. In politics as well as in daily discourse, provision for children is seen as important.
And yet, very little on the position of children is to be found in contemporary theories of social and distributional justice. Since John Rawls's path-breaking book, A Theory of Justice (1971) , there has been a flowering of publications discussing principles for the just society in general and just principles of economic distribution in particular. But justice to children is very rarely mentioned. Rawls (1997) explicitly writes that children are not parties to the social contract he proposes. In spite of this, I find that the logic of Rawlsian theory is well suited to discuss the rights of children. The main part of this paper will discuss children's place in a Rawlsian theory.
In Bojer (2000) I argue that two much cited classes of theories, namely welfarism and libertarianism, not only ignore children, they simply do not apply to the situation of children. By welfarism, I mean utilitarianism and economic welfare theory. Amartya Sen explains welfarism in this way:
Welfarism in general, and utilitarianism in particular, see value, ultimately, only in individual utility, which is defined in terms of some mental characteristic, such as pleasure, happiness or desire. (Sen 1992: 6) Moreover, the tastes (preferences) that determine the individual's happiness are assumed to be unchanging over time, and not subject to change or manipulation by the economic and social environment. This assumption can be defended as a useful simplification in the case of adults, but is manifestly absurd applied to children.
A basic tenet of libertarianism is that an individual is entitled only to what he himself produces, or what other producers freely choose to give her. Since children are not, and cannot be, producers, the entitlement theory cannot apply to them. Children are excluded from the framework of libertarian distributional justice; they have no rights or entitlements.
There are several reasons why children do not fit easily into any philosophy of social justice, whether systematic philosophical theories or intuitive tenets. One reason is the connection between justice and deserts, or merits. Children are essentially innocent: they have (not yet) merited either rewards or punishment from society. In particular, it is impossible to reward children according to effort or according their contribution to society, 'the fruit of their labours'.
Another reason is that children are regarded as a part of the family and of private life, outside the domain of public justice.
But children are also of the utmost importance to society. They are what in economic terminology is called a public good.
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That is, the birth and upbringing of children have effects on all members of a society, the childless as well as parents. One reason is that human labour is the most important factor of production, of development and growth. This fact is the basis for the utilitarian argument for 'investing in children', and makes the production and education of children a public concern of the greatest importance. Furthermore, economic problems are caused both by too few and too many children being born. Natality in several industrialized countries is now so low that the size of the population will decline in the long run. One effect is that the welfare state is said to be threatened because there are too few youngsters growing up to feed the many elderly. Conversely, a large rate of growth in the population is considered a hindrance for development in the third world. Even though some of the problems created can be (and are) mitigated by migration, public policies are still needed that can regulate population growth, increase it in some countries, decrease it in others.
At the same time, the begetting of a child is an intensely intimate human experience. Thus, the most private of actions can have momentous public consequences. There is an intrinsic connection here between the private and the public interest which has had some extremely unpleasant consequences in governmental policies for reducing the birth rate. A well known example of government brutality in the 'public interest' is the forced sterilisation of men carried out by Indira Gandhi's government in India. Another is the one child policy of the present Chinese government. Fortunately, it has by now become clear that the most efficient way of reducing the number of births to combat over-population is a more humanitarian and attractive policy, namely that of empowering women to control their own fertility. Being pregnant, giving birth, and then nurturing and caring for children is a painful, burdensome, time consuming and expensive project that the majority of women do not enter on lightly.
Public policies to encourage women to bear children are correspondingly easy to recommend. They consist in providing time and money to assist the parents, and the mothers in particular, in their task.
From the point of view of justice, however, it is not obvious that parenthood in itself creates rights. In modern society, having a child is a voluntary decision, and people should, it is claimed, take responsibility for their own actions. Eric Rakowski writes: 'If the cultivation of expensive tastes, or silly gambles, or any other intentional action, cannot give rise to distributional claims, how can procreation?' (Rakowski 1993: 153) I have heard one of my own colleagues ask why acquiring children should be regarded differently from acquiring any other expensive commodity, like cars.
In one way, these views are simply silly. Still, since they are sometimes heard in public debate, let me spell out some differences between children on the one hand, cars and gambling debts on the other.
Children are human beings, not consumer goods. Procreation, acquiring children, is the same as acquiring moral, legal and economic long-term obligations different in nature from any others. A single gambler takes risks that concern himself only. A bad father risks the life and happiness of his child. A car can be resold, traded in, or left in the garage to rust if the buyer finds that it does not make him happy after all, or if he prefers another model. No such way out is possible if parenthood turns out not to give happiness, or if the acquired child is not up to standard. Becoming a parent is irreversible.
Becoming a parent also, always and in every society, entails responsibilities that no distributional policies or social arrangements can entirely remove. But both the extent and precise content of parental responsibilities are shaped by society, and vary considerably from one society to the other. The importance of social circumstances for the consequences of parenthood are most starkly seen in the hugely differing situation of unmarried mothers, and their children, in various societies at various times.
Therefore there is every reason to discuss the justice of parents' claims apart from the fact that, as argued above, society has an interest in children being born, educated and socialised. I shall try to show that the Rawlsian social contract also covers parents' rights.
Children are in the first place the responsibility of their parents. I like the way John Locke put it:
From [Adam] the world is peopled with his descendants who are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or understanding. But to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till the improvements of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them, all parents were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate the children they had begotten, not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.
......... The power then, that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their offspring during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to. (Locke [1689 (Locke [ ] 1993 Here, Locke makes it clear that parents do not have unlimited power over their children: they hold the children, as it were, in trust.
But the parents may not have adequate means to 'preserve, nourish and educate' the children they have begotten. On the other hand, parents sometimes have the means, but not the will, to fulfill their obligation. Moreover, nourishing and caring for children takes time, time that cannot be spent earning one's living.
So we must ask the question: do children have just claims on society as a whole as well as on their parents? And to what extent are parents accountable to society and the state as well as to the Almighty for the way they treat their children?
Distributional policy aimed at children raises three different questions of distributional justice. The first is that of distribution over the life cycle; distribution between children and adults. The second is that of distribution between children. The third is that of distribution between generations. Rawls himself discusses the just distribution between generations, but makes his analysis depend on the assumption that each generation cares for the well-being of the next; a type of assumption he does not use as a basis for the main part of his work.
The present article will discuss distribution over the life course, and, to some extent, the distribution between children. In the following sections, I shall discuss how these questions are answered within the Rawlsian framework for social justice.
Children and the Rawlsian social contract
Rawls deduces his social contract from a thought experiment. Imagine an original position where free and equal persons meet to decide on the basic structure, the social contract, of a just society. The agreement must be made behind a thick veil of ignorance: the parties to the contract do not know their sex, their talents, their political and religious persuasion, their economic and social position in society. They do, however, know everything else there is to know about humankind and society. They are also rational, in the sense that the agreement is made on the basis of enlightened self interest.
In other words: the parties must choose a social contract for a society they could like to live in whatever kind of person they will turn out to be, and whichever ultimate good they will turn out to have for their lives. Their problem can be stated as a form of choice under uncertainty.
Rawls argues that the parties will unanimously choose a society based on two fundamental principles: a principle of freedom and a principle of social and economic equality. The principle of freedom implies all the basic political liberties as well as the freedom for every individual to pursue the life project she chooses, to the extent that the project does not infringe on the similar liberty of other persons. The principle of equality Rawls states in a form which he confusingly calls the difference principle: social and economic inequalities are permissible only to the extent that they are to the advantage of the least favoured group of society. The reason why a certain degree of inequality might be of advantage to the least favoured lies in the possibility of economic incentives contributing to make production more efficient: increasing the 'size of the pie'.
Several critics have argued that the difference principle does not follow logically from Rawls's premisses. But we do not have to accept the difference principle in order to find out what follows for the situation of children and their parents in the just society. The parties in the original situation are not ignorant of the facts of life in general, just of their own position in the order of things. Therefore, they know with certainty that they will start life as helpless infants, and spend their formative years utterly dependent on adults for their shelter, nourishment and care. They also know that the overwhelming majority of humankind want to have children if they command the necessary time and other economic resources.
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It would seem then, that the parties in the original position would first of all secure for themselves favourable conditions during childhood. It is impossible to believe that rational agents would choose to face the risk of spending their childhood without rights, and without a lawful claim on society for protection from abuse, neglect and starvation. In particular, they would not wish to be the unconditional property of their parents. This will hold, I feel, whatever conclusions one may reach about the difference principle, and whatever weight we give to economic equality among adults.
In order to say something stronger about conditions for children, we need an idea of what is 'the good of children'. I shall discuss this in section 3.
For reasons explained in several papers, and especially in 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' (1997), Rawls deliberately limits his discussion of justice to the rights and duties of normal adults as free citizens. He does not want his theory to encroach on what he considers to be private life. I suspect this is because private life, understood as the position of women and children in the family, is a particularly touchy matter in a 'multicultural' society, and often connected to what are perceived as religious duties and tenets. However, if we look at Rawls's premisses, they contain nothing that should make the parties exclude childhood from their deliberations.
And, in spite of Rawls's liberal worries on this score, a society where the state protects the rights of children while otherwise based on the Rawlsian social contract, will be a liberal one for the adults. There is nothing illiberal in the nanny state for children: children need nannies. For adults, there will be every kind of freedom, except the freedom to neglect and abuse their children. There will, moreover, be a civil society and a private sphere free from government intervention. But the boundary between government and civil society, between public and private spheres, will be drawn differently from that envisaged by Rawls and traditional political liberalism.
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The Rawlsian social contract can be interpreted as a framework for social insurance: every member of society is insured from before birth against certain contingencies. The parties in the original position determine the terms of insurance, and which contingencies it covers. One near certainty it is reasonable to cover, is that of becoming a parent. Therefore, in a society built on the Rawlsian social contract, parents as well as their children have a moral claim for support. Rakowski is wrong: procreation does give rise to claims even though gambling does not.
The good of children: primary goods and capabilities
Rawls defines a liberal society as a society which allows several, conflicting and incommensurable ideas of the good. The good here means the good life: what we want to live for and strive for in life. The good may, but need not, be welfare, well-being, happiness. In a liberal society, these several goods cannot, by definition, be provided by the state, since the state cannot, indeed ought not, know the good of each separate citizen. Individual welfare, or well-being, in particular, neither can nor should be the goal of public policy. The individual is responsible for her own welfare, the business of the state is to provide each person with the means necessary for obtaining welfare -or whichever other good she strives for. Therefore, Rawls does not accept welfare as the goal of distributional or any other policies. He postulates that there exists what he calls primary goods, goods that every rational human being has a use for, whatever her preferences. As examples of primary goods he gives 'rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth' as well as 'the social bases for selfrespect'. The first edition of A Theory of Justice can be read as if the primary goods were rooted in basic human nature, genetically and biologically determined. In later papers, particularly in 'Social Unity and Primary Goods', Rawls stresses that primary goods are not based on a specific philosophical view of human nature. Primary goods are necessary to every person as a citizen in society, and to underline this Rawls calls them 'social primary goods'. Here again, he clearly does not have children in mind. In particular, the primary good 'income and wealth' is not suitable as the distributary good directed at children.
Another way of defining the quality of life and human advantage, independently of the preferences of the individual, is the capability approach advocated by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.
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The rationale of the capability approach is found in Sen's statement that the important thing is '... the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do and bethe various "functionings" he or she can achieve. (Sen 1993: 30) ' The term capabilities denotes what a person is capable of being and doing. The 'beings and doings' themselves are called functionings.
By the capability approach is meant that the good to be aimed at in distributional and other public policies should be a bundle of capabilities for each individual; capabilities to achieve valuable functionings. The qualifier valuable here is important, since there are, conceivably, a great many desirable functionings. Examples of valuable functionings are adequate nourishment and social participation. Sen uses the example of lack of nourishment to illustrate the difference between a capability and the corresponding functioning. A starving person lacks the capability to nourish herself. A person who fasts, does so voluntarily. She has the capability of nourishment, but has chosen not to achieve the functioning.
The just distribution of income in capability terms is therefore the distribution that secures a just distribution of capabilities. Equality of income does not secure equality of capabilities for a number of reasons; these are most clearly set out in chapters 3 and 4 of Sen's Development as Freedom (1999) . One of them is that different people may need different amounts of economic goods to achieve the same capabilities. The obvious examples are people with chronic illnesses like diabetes who need medication in order to function normally and people with physical handicaps who need special equipment in order to be mobile.
Martha Nussbaum distinguishes between three kinds of capabilities. There are basic capabilities, like hearing and seeing and the newborn child's innate capability for developing speech and language. Then internal capabilities that are developed in the adult person, like the capability for sexual pleasure and for free speech. Finally, there are combined capabilities 'which may be defined as internal capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function.' (Nussbaum 2000: 84-85 .)
The concept of combined capabilities brings out that capabilities depend both on the endowments of the individual and on the way society is organised. An external condition for free speech is, of course, a society which allows freedom of speech, while a necessary external condition for the capability of sexual pleasure is the absence of genital mutilation.
The last example may be used as another illustration of the difference between the capability of functioning and the functioning itself. Sexual pleasure is not necessarily a functioning that everyone chooses to achieve. We may choose to remain celibate for a variety of reasons, religious or practical. The point of the capability approach is that there should be a free choice. Genital mutilation deprive women of that choice. Whether some of them would have chosen to abstain from sexual pleasure in any case is not to the point. Claiming the capability of sexual pleasure for every human being is different from claiming that social welfare increases with the number of orgasms per capita achieved.
No government can secure that all capabilities are equal. The government cannot make us all healthy or supply us all with equal amounts of the hormones that determine sexuality. But the government can provide a public health service and forbid genital mutilation. The government can deliver the social basis of such capabilities.
Sen argues that the capabilities to be targeted by public policy in a given society should be decided on after and by means of open democratic deliberation. This attitude is very much in the spirit of John Rawls, who argues that the goods to be distributed according to the difference principle should be ..a practical and limited list of things (primary goods) which free and equal moral persons, ... can accept that they in general need as citizens in a free society. (Rawls 1982: 183) Moreover, the concepts of capabilities and of social primary goods are closely related: 'The capabilities approach, as I have articulated it, is very close to Rawls's approach using the notion of primary goods. We can see the list of capabilities as like a long list of opportunities for functioning, such that it is always rational to want them whatever else one wants. (Nussbaum 2000: 88) '
It seems to me that children's present and future capabilities are admirably suited to be the targets of government policies. The capability approach is as yet just that: an approach. It may or may not be operationalised as a set of measurable goals for public policy. It may or may not be superseded by other approaches. For the time being, it seems to be the best available theory of the public good covering the whole life-cycle within the framework of liberal egalitarianism.
Just policies toward children
The Rawlsian social contract, modified to make individual capabilities the target of public policies, gives us a framework for discussing both distribution over the life-cycle (between children and adults) and distribution between children.
I claimed in section 2 that rational choice in the original position would secure favourable conditions for every person in childhood. These favourable conditions will first of all consist in securing for every child the right to protection from abuse, neglect and starvation. Secondly, they would consist in securing for every child the flowering of present and development of future capabilities. These principles would obtain independently of the degree of economic equality chosen for adults.
We do not need a fully worked out operational set of goals in order to set out the broad features of public policy to secure a satisfactory social basis for children's present and future capabilities. We know that children need love, security, a reasonable amount of material comfort, education, health care and opportunities to grow and develop.
The state, however benevolent, cannot secure love and emotional attachments. These matters are, and must be, the responsibility of the parents, biological or social. In the just society, we have seen that children are not the property of their parents: children's rights go before parents' rights when there is a conflict. It is in the children's best interest that there is a balance of power between parents and public authorities. This balance of power I imagine must be continually discussed and revised.
The bases for other capabilities are a public responsibility. Some policies can and should target the children's capabilities direct, independently of the parents: free education and health care of reasonable quality for all are the most important. I feel the capability approach is a useful framework also for discussing the contents of education, but this is outside my competence.
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The capability approach does not imply equality in the economic resources spent on children; public resources should be distributed according to need in the sense of what is needed to develop valuable capabilities.
Conditions for physical security, opportunities for play and interaction with other children and with grownups cannot in modern urban societies be left to the parents, they must be part of the physical public planning of the environment.
When children and parents live together, the necessary material comfort of children cannot be separated from that of the parents. Securing an adequate home to live in is of particular importance, and an area where parents tend to need some financial and practical assistance.
Since children live with their parents, there will be economic inequality among children as long as there is economic inequality among adults. Now, there is no possible moral justification for economic and social inequality between children except what may be needed to secure the just distribution of their present and future capabilities. But complete equality in external conditions during childhood can only be obtained by completely cutting them off from parents and family and letting them grow up in government run institutions. Such a policy seems unduly brutal towards both parents and children.
A policy geared towards securing every child the necessary resources to develop her capabilities will, however, ensure that there will be considerably less inequality between children than between adults, and that the remaining inequalities will not seriously damage the future prospects of less favoured children.
The policies I have sketched above constitute, in one form or another, the family policy of the traditional welfare state. The are also encoded in the United Nations declaration on the rights of children. Some of them are under attack in the present political climate. I have tried to show that the Rawlsian social contract gives a strong moral justification for resisting these
